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Abstract
We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications
market on an entrants decision whether to invest in a network or ask
for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand.
Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after
entry in order to convince the regulator that it needs cheap access in
the future, the regulator must set access prices which tend to be dis-
torted (lower or higher) as compared to rst best. Still, this is better
than committing to ignore ex post demand information. Consulting
the entrant earlier about its expectations improves welfare and may
help to achieve the rst best.
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1 Introduction
Telecommunications markets are often characterized by the presence of an op-
erator, the previously state-owned rm, that enjoys signicant market power
due to high entry barriers. These result mainly from the large investments
in terms of money and time that the building of a new network requires,
which makes it di¢ cult for a new operator to enter the market as a full
facility-based competitor, at least in the short run.
To solve this problem, regulatory authorities may require the incumbent
to make parts of its network available to rms that want to enter the market
but have no capacity to build a complete network. Operators can then enter
as service-based competitors by using the incumbents network to supply
their services, paying an access price in return.
However, in the long run, the regulatorsmain objective is to have facility-
based competition since it increases the incentives for product innovation
and cost reduction. Moreover, only when rms have their own network can
competition be sustainable without the intervention of a regulator.
The objectives of creating competition in the short run and having facility-
based competition in the long run were traditionally seen as contradictory.
Only recently, the European Commission started claiming that there is no
trade-o¤ between these two types of competition, based on the Investment
Ladder Theory, see Cave and Vogelsang (2003). According to this theory,
service-based competition can lead to facility-based competition if it is man-
aged correctly. Initially, regulators should encourage entry into retail markets
where signicant market power was found by setting low access prices. Then,
over time, once entrants have consolidated their position in the market and
investment costs are lower, regulators should start to increase access prices.
Entrants are then expected to respond to these increases by investing in their
own network.
Yet, the Investment Ladder Theoryis di¢ cult to implement due to the
asymmetry of information which characterizes telecommunications markets.
As Oldale and Padilla (2004) argue, operators generally have superior infor-
mation about the quality of their products and the reaction of consumers,
while regulators can only infer entrantsdemand by the observation of their
performance after entry. Hence, when regulators observe that entrants are
still dependent on cheap access to compete in the market, because demand is
low, they continue to set low access prices. However, if entrants are already
doing well, with a large client base, regulators can ban access in order to
induce them to invest. This gives the wrong incentives to entrants since it
penalizes entrants that do well, while protecting the ones that do badly. As
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a result, given that regulators are not able to observe entrantspotential de-
mand but only their realized demand, entrants may have incentives to shirk,
i.e. to target a lower demand by investing less in advertising or by adopting
a less aggressive behavior in the market, in order to induce regulators to set
lower access prices in the future.
In the following, we argue that this introduces distortions even when
regulators take their decision before competition and can commit to it, since
the resulting optimal outcome are access prices which depend on demand
observations.
There are other motives that may lead entrants to shirk. For instance,
Pénard (2000) shows that an entrant invests less in capacity in order not to
provoke an aggressive response by the incumbent, practicing what is known
in the literature as "judo economics".
This problem of incentives can be explored in the context of signaling
games. There are few applications of this type of games to a telecommuni-
cations regulation context. Sarmento (2003), for instance, considers a model
where the telecommunications incumbent uses its price as a signal about the
demand size of potential entrants in order to induce the regulator to allow
only a small number of entrants. Contrary to her paper, in our model, the
receiver of the signal, the regulator, is the rst to move by setting the access
prices. Thus, he can use the Revelation Principle, due to Myerson (1979),
to construct a direct-revelation mechanism with a truth-telling equilibrium.
This is similar to the mechanisms used by regulators in contexts of asym-
metric information about costs described in La¤ont and Tirole (1993, 1994).
We construct a dynamic framework with two periods of telecommunica-
tions competition, two operators (an incumbent and an entrant), and asym-
metric information about demand, to analyze the impact of access regula-
tion on the entry strategies of the entrant. Similarly to Bourreau and Dogan
(2005), the entrant can compete in the market as a service-based competi-
tor by asking for access to the incumbents network, or as a facility-based
competitor by building an own network. We introduce the asymmetry of
information by assuming that the entrant observes the state of demand after
entry, which can be either low or high, while the regulator has just prior
beliefs about the probability of each state occurring. Yet, the regulator can
observe the demand captured by the entrant at the end of the rst period.
In case of a low demand state, we assume that it is too expensive for the
entrant to invest in an own network, and thus it will always need access to
the incumbents network to be able to compete. On the other hand, when
demand is high, the entrant may opt to invest in a new infrastructure after
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asking for access in the rst period. First-best access prices will then involve
inducing the entrant to invest in the second period in the case of a high
demand state, and promoting service-based competition in both periods in
the case of a low demand state.
We rst show that welfare is higher if the regulator sets second-period
access prices contingent on rst-period demand observation which induce
the entrant to reveal the demand state. However, this introduces some
distortions: When the entrants prot decreases faster (slower) in the access
price for a higher demand, the rst-period access price set by the regulator is
lower (higher) than the one he would set if the entrant did not have incentives
to shirk. Additionally, in order to make the gains from shirking lower, the
regulator sets a higher second-period access price contingent on low demand.
In an extreme case, if the probability of low demand is su¢ ciently low, the
access price may be such that a low-type entrant leaves the market. The
second-period access price contingent on high demand may or may not force
a high-type entrant to invest. The latter is optimal when the probability of
a high demand state is low enough. Still this is better than committing not
to look.
Next, we extend our model to the case where investment is never viable,
and show that most of our previous conclusions continue to hold since a
high-type entrant still wants lower rather than higher access prices. When
investment is viable in both states the regulator simply needs to ban access
in the second period, and therefore there are no incentives to shirk.
Finally, we introduce a consultation stage which takes place before the
entrant starts competing. In this stage the regulator asks the entrant about
its expected demand level. This allows him to set ex ante rst-period access
prices contingent on the answer given by the entrant, and second-period
access prices contingent on the concordance of the observed demand with the
entrants answer, so that if the entrant is caught lying it can be penalized.
Due to the increase in the regulators knowledge, this consultation stage
improves welfare, and the complete information rst best may be possible to
achieve, although under restrictive circumstances.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the model
in Section 2. In Section 3 we determine the rst-best access prices, while in
Section 4 we solve the regulators problem under asymmetric information. In
Section 5 we consider the cases where investment is (not) possible in both
states. In Section 6 we introduce a consultation stage before competition
starts, and in Section 7 we conclude.
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2 The Model
We introduce a model with two periods of telecommunications competition
and asymmetric information about demand. There are two rms that com-
pete in this market: the incumbent, which is a vertically integrated rm and
has a network and a retail business, and the entrant, which only has a retail
business. Future prots are discounted by a factor   1:
In the rst period, the entrant can compete in the market as a service-
based competitor by buying access to the incumbents infrastructure and
paying in return an access price which consists on a usage charge r: In the
second period, the entrant can opt between competing as a service-based
competitor or as a facility-based competitor by investing in an own network.
We assume that the entrant can only invest in the second period because it
does not have the capacity to enter the market as a facility-based competitor
in the short run. This is equivalent to assume that investment cost in the
rst period is too high for an investment to be viable.
Finally, we introduce a regulator who sets the access prices for both pe-
riods in order to maximize social welfare. We assume that the access prices
are the only instrument available to the regulator. This corresponds closely
to current European practice.
The demand faced by the entrant can be high (H) or low (L) with a
probability of  and 1   ; respectively. The entrant learns the demand
state after entry, and we assume that the sunk cost of entry is su¢ ciently
low as compared to expected prots, so that the it always enters, although
it may decide not to compete in one of the periods. On the other hand,
the regulator does not observe the demand state. He only has prior beliefs
equal to (; 1  ) about the probability of each state occurring. This is a
realistic assumption because the regulator does not have perfect information
about the expected reaction of consumers after the entry of a new rm. Yet,
we assume that at the end of the rst period the regulator can observe the
entrants captured demand.
The regulator sets the access prices for both periods at the beginning of
the game and commits to them until the end. Hence, while he cannot revise
the access prices after observing demand in the rst period, he can set second-
period access prices contingent on the demand captured by the entrant in the
rst period. He thus sets r1, r2L and r2H ; which are, respectively, the access
price for the rst period, the access price for the second period if the entrants
demand in the rst period is low, and if it is high. If the entrant does not
compete in the rst period the regulator sets r2 for the second period.
Given that the regulator does not observe the state of demand, but only
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the realized demand, the entrant in the high demand state can choose to
target low demand in the rst period in order to signal to the regulator that
it is a low-type entrant. It just needs to make less e¤ort in advertising, or
compete less intensively on prices. It can even decide not to compete in the
rst period if, for the access price set, the low-type entrant best response is
to stay out of the market. In both these cases we say that the high-type
entrant is shirking (X). This may be prot-maximizing, despite the lower
prots in the rst period, if it allows the entrant to benet from a low access
price in the second period, as it will be confused with a low-type entrant.
The low-type entrant cannot do anything except to capture low demand.
We now introduce the notation we will use for the rest of the paper.
In both periods, if the high-type entrant decides to compete as a service-
based competitor and captures high demand its prot is given by HS (r) and
welfare by wHS (r) : If, on the other hand, the high-type entrant shirks, these
are given, respectively, by XS (r) and w
X
S (r) : If the high-type entrant decides
to compete as a facility-based competitor in the second period, prot and
welfare are, respectively, HF and w
H
F .
If the low-type entrant competes as a service-based competitor its prot
is LS (r) and welfare is w
L
S (r) ; both in period 1 and 2, while if it competes as
a facility-based competitor in the second period they are given, respectively,
by LF and w
L
F :
Finally, in monopoly welfare is given by wM :
Before proceeding, we need to make some assumptions.
Service-based competition
First of all, the access prices set by the regulator can never be such that
the incumbent does not want to operate its network since in that case there
would not be any rm in the market. Hence, we assume that the access price
for a given i = H;X;L cannot be lower than rimin, which is the limit below
which the incumbents prot is negative.
The entrants prot during service-based competition is decreasing and
di¤erentiable in r, and it is negative for a su¢ ciently high access price:
diS (r)
dr
< 0, iS
 
rimax

= 0 with rimax > r
i
min; 8i = H;X;L: (1)
This implies that an entrant which is not shirking does not ask for access if
the access price is above rimax: Its prot in the rst period is then:
i1 (r) =

iS (r) if r
i
min  r  rimax
0 if r > rimax
; 8i = H;L: (2)
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If the high-type entrant shirks, it does not ask for access for r > rLmax;
otherwise it would be detected by the regulator. Thus, its rst-period prot
is:
X1 (r) =

XS (r) if r
X
min  r  rLmax
0 if r > rLmax
: (3)
Note that X1 (r) can be negative if r
L
max > r
X
max: Indeed, it can be prot-
maximizing for the high-type entrant to incur negative prots in the rst
period by shirking because it expects to obtain benets from a lower access
price in the second period.
We also assume that, for a given access price, the entrants prot dur-
ing service-based competition is higher when it captures high demand as
compared with prots when it captures low demand:
HS (r) > max

XS (r) ; 
L
S (r)
	
; 8r 2 rHmin; rHmax : (4)
This assumption together with (1) implies that:
rHmax > max

rLmax; r
X
max
	
: (5)
Regarding welfare, we assume that during service-based competition, and
for a given access price, it is higher when the entrant captures high demand:
wHS (r) > max

wXS (r) ; w
L
S (r)
	
; 8r 2 rHmin; rHmax : (6)
Additionally, we assume that in each state the welfare function is di¤er-
entiable in r; strictly concave and has a unique maximizer ri for i = H;L:
We leave open which of rL or r

H is larger, but we assume that they are both
higher than rmin  max

rHmin; r
L
min
	
:
Finally, we assume that, whatever the demand state, welfare is higher
with duopoly than with monopoly:
wiS (r) > wM for r 2

rimin; r
i
max

; 8i = H;L: (7)
Example
We can use as an example which fullls these assumptions about service-
based competition the partial-consumer participation model used in Vareda
(2007). In this paper, demand functions are similar to Bowley (1924), and
given by:
qI =
aI   pI + pE   aE
1  2 (8)
qE =
aE   pE + pI   aI
1  2 ; (9)
6
where (ak; qk; pk) are the reservation price, the number of subscribers and the
subscription price of operator k; with k = I for the incumbent and k = E
for the entrant.  2 (0; 1) indicates the degree of substitutability between
the services o¤ered by the two operators. The incumbent incurs a constant
marginal cost c while the entrant pays r per unit to the incumbent: Firms
compete in prices (see Appendix A).
The Hotelling model, as in Bourreau and Dogan (2005), does not satisfy
our assumptions since the entrants prot is insensitive to the access price
for a large interval of prices. Thus, in their model, one cannot consider many
welfare e¤ects.
Facility-based competition
In the second period the entrant can build an own network. This invest-
ment costs the entrant I, and for now, until Section 5, we assume that:
HF  I > LF : (10)
It follows that the low-type entrant will never want to invest in an own
network, while the high-type entrant may nd it optimal. Indeed, if the
regulator sets a su¢ ciently high access price for the second period, the high-
type entrant prefers to invest rather than ask for access.
Lemma 1 There is a unique rH 2

rHmin; r
H
max

such that:
HF   I  HS (r) ; (11)
if and only if r  rH :
Proof. The RHS of (11) is strictly decreasing in r by assumption, while
the LHS is constant. Given assumption (10), we know that HF   I 
HS
 
rHmax

= 0. Thus, there will be at most one rH 2

rHmin; r
H
max

such
that HF   I = HS (rH). If HF   I > HS
 
rHmin

; then rH = rHmin:
Thus rH is the lowest access price where the entrant prefers to invest in
an own network. Below this, service-based competition is the best option for
the high-type entrant.
Assuming that in case of indi¤erence the high-type entrant chooses to
invest, its prot in the second period is:
H2 (r) =

HS (r) if r
H
min  r < rH
HF   I if r  rH ; (12)
while the prot of a low-type entrant is similar to the rst-periods prot,
i.e. L2 (r) = 
L
1 (r) :
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Timing of the game:
i) At moment zero, the entrant enters the market and Nature selects
demand size, H or L, with probability  and 1 , respectively, with  2 [0; 1].
The entrant observes Natures choice.
ii) At the beginning of the rst period, the regulator sets the access prices
for both periods (r1, r2; r2L and r2H) given prior beliefs (; 1  ) about the
probability of each state of demand:
iii) The entrant decides if it stays out of the market or if it competes
in the rst period as a service-based competitor by asking for access at r1.
The high-type entrant can additionally decide between targeting low or high
demand.
iv) First-period payo¤s are realized. If the entrant competes in the rst
period, the regulator observes the entrants captured demand and decides
whether r2L or r2H will hold in period 2. If the entrant does not compete,
the regulator sets r2:
v) The entrant chooses between staying out of the market, asking for
access at the given access price or building an own network at a cost of I.
vi) Second period payo¤s are realized.
3 First-best access prices
3.1 Complete information
In this section we determine the rst-best access prices in case of complete
information, i.e. when the regulator observes Natures choice immediately
after it takes place.
According to assumption (1), rst-period welfare for each demand state
if the entrant does not shirk is:
W i1 (r) =

wiS (r) if r
i
min  r  rimax
wM if r > r
i
max
; 8i = H;L: (13)
Given our assumption wiS (r
i
max) > wM ; these welfare functions are not
continuous at rimax, and can be plotted as in Figure 1.
Lemma 2 When the regulator has complete information about demand, the
rst-period rst-best access price for the high demand state is rfb1H = r

H ; and
for the low demand state is rfb1L = r

L.
Proof. Given (7) it is always better to have two rms competing rather
than one. The result then follows from our assumption about the existence
of a unique maximum on each service-based competition welfare function.
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Figure 1
In the second period, welfare in the low demand state is similar to the
rst period since we assume that the low-type entrant never invests in an
own network. Hence:
WL2 (r) =W
L
1 (r) : (14)
As for the high demand state, the entrant invests if the access price is
su¢ ciently high. Thus, the second-period welfare in the high demand state
is:
WH2 (r) =

wHS (r) if r
H
min  r < rH
wHF   I if r  rH : (15)
According to this, a perfectly informed regulator prefers to have facility-
based competition in the high demand state if and only if:
wHF   I > wHS (r) ; 8r 2

rHmin; rH

: (16)
We assume that (16) holds, since this corresponds to regulators prefer-
ences for facility-based competition in the long run. Thus, second-period
welfare in the high demand state can be plotted as in Figure 2.1
Just looking at Figures 1 and 2 it is easy to determine the rst-best access
prices for the second period.
1This is represented for rH > rH : If rH < r

H ; the second branch starts before the rst
reaches its maximum.
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Figure 2
Lemma 3 When the regulator has complete information about demand, the
rst-best access price for the second period is rfb2H  rH in case of high de-
mand, and rfb2L = r

L in case of low demand:
Proof. According to assumption (16) the regulator prefers to induce the
high-type entrant to invest. Thus, given Lemma 1, he sets r2H  rH : In case
of low demand, it is impossible to force investment, thus the regulator sets
the access price which maximizes welfare under service-based competition.
This result explains the incentives for strategic behavior by the high-type
entrant. Indeed, given that the regulator prefers to set a higher access price
for the second period in case of high demand, the high-type entrant may have
incentives to shirk in the rst period in order not to be obliged to invest, and
benet from a low access price in the second period.
3.2 Incomplete information in rst period only
We now determine the socially optimal access prices when the regulator does
not observe Natures choice at the beginning of the game, but observes the
true state of demand after the rst period. This is equivalent to a context
where the high-type entrant cannot shirk, and thus the demand it captures
in the rst period is a perfect signal of the demand state.
In the second period, the regulator has perfect information, therefore the
socially optimal access price for each demand state is equal to the complete
information case. However, for the rst period the regulator can only maxi-
mize expected welfare given prior beliefs.
10
Lemma 4 If rH  rLmax; when the regulator can only observe the state of
demand after the rst period, the rst-period socially optimal access price is:
rE = argmax

WH1 (r) + (1  )WL1 (r)
	
; (17)
and both types of entrant ask for access.
Proof. Given that wHS (r) and w
L
S (r) are strictly concave for r < r
L
max,
expected welfare is also strictly concave in this interval. Moreover, at rLmax
and rHmax there are downward jumps by assumption (7). Thus, if r

H < r
L
max;
WH1 (r) + (1  )WL1 (r) has a unique maximum rE 2
 
rmin; r
L
max

since
d(WH1 (r)+(1 )WL1 (r))
dr

r>rLmax
< 0, and ri > rmin; 8i = H;L: Therefore both
types of entrant ask for access (see Figure 3).
Figure 3
Given that it maximizes expected welfare, rE will be somewhere between
rH and r

L: If r

H > r
L
max; we could have r

E > r
L
max, and the low-type entrant
would not ask for access in the rst period. However, for the rest of the paper
we assume that rH  rLmax:
4 Optimal regulation under asymmetric in-
formation
In this section we solve our model under the assumption that the regulator
can never observe the true state of demand, and takes his decisions about
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the access prices at the beginning of the game. Hence, he sets the access
price for the rst period only based on prior beliefs about the probability of
each demand state. However, as he can observe the demand captured by the
entrant at the end of the rst period, the second-period access prices can be
set contingent on this observation. We further assume that the regulator has
the ability to commit to these access prices until the end of the game.
Note that the complete information rst-best access prices are impossible
to set in this scenario since the regulator is not able to set rst period access
prices contingent on any signal about demand state. The best he can do is
to achieve the incomplete information socially optimal outcome.
As we said before, in both periods, the low-type entrant will only choose
between asking for access or staying out of the market. On the other hand,
the high-type entrant can behave strategically in the rst period, i.e. choose
its target demand by comparing discounted prots if it shirks or if it captures
high demand. It will prefer to shirk in the rst period, sacricing some
prots, if the discounted benet from paying an access price contingent on
low demand in the second period is su¢ ciently high, i.e.

 
H2 (r2L)  H2 (r2H)

> H1 (r1)  X1 (r1) : (18)
If the regulator ignored this incentive for shirking by the high-type en-
trant, he would set the incomplete information socially optimal access prices,
since he would believe that the demand observed in the rst period was a
perfect signal of the real state of demand. In this case, the high-type entrant
would not shirk if and only if:

 
H2 (r

L)  HF + I
  H1 (rE)  X1 (rE) : (19)
This certainly happens if rL is higher than rH , as in this case the high-type
entrant would also invest in the second period for the access price contingent
on low demand. Even if rL < rH , it is possible to achieve the incomplete
information socially optimal outcome when for rE the losses from shirking
are high enough. Otherwise, the high-type entrant would prefer to target low
demand.
However, the regulator understands this behavior by the entrant. There-
fore, if he wants the high-type entrant to reveal the true state of demand he
must set access prices such that revealing the state of demand is the entrants
best response. Indeed, the regulator can apply the Revelation Principle by
constructing a direct-revelation mechanism with a truth-telling equilibrium
as in La¤ont and Tirole (1993, 1994). The resulting welfare is the best that
12
the regulator can achieve by taking into account the entrants demand in
the rst period. This may come at some cost since he will have to leave
additional rents to the high-type entrant as compared to the rst best, while
other outcomes are even worse. The only alternative is to commit to ignore
rst-period demand, on which we will comment below.
Proposition 5 The separating equilibrium is socially preferred to a pooling
equilibrium where the high-type entrant shirks.
Proof. Suppose that (rpe1 ; r
pe
2L; r
pe
2H) are the access prices leading to a
pooling equilibrium: This is dominated by a separating equilibrium as the
regulator can always set r2L = r2H = r
pe
2L and the high-type entrant does not
shirk. In this case, welfare is the same in the second period, but it is higher
in the rst period.
The regulator then solves the following direct-revelation mechanism prob-
lem:
max
r1;r2L;r2H

WH1 (r1) + (1  )WL1 (r1) + 
 
WH2 (r2H) + (1  )WL2 (r2L)
	
;
(20)
subject to the conditions that:
H1 (r1)  X1 (r1)  
 
H2 (r2L)  H2 (r2H)

(21)
r1  rmin (22)
r2H  rHmin (23)
r2L  rLmin: (24)
The rst restriction in the regulators problem is the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint and guarantees that the best strategy for the high-type entrant
is to target high demand. Whenever (19) does not hold, (21) becomes active
and the regulator has to introduce distortions as compared to the socially
optimal access prices. The other three restrictions are only to assure that
the incumbent operates its network in both periods.
We do not introduce participation constraints for the entrant since it may
be optimal for the regulator to leave one type of entrant out of the market.
For instance, in order to force the high-type entrant to reveal demand and
invest, the regulator may be forced to set r2L higher than rLmax, and thus a
low-type entrant will not ask for access in the second period. The impact of
having the entrant not participating in the market is included in the welfare
and prot functions, which are also dened for the range of access prices
where the entrant does not compete.
13
The Lagrangian of this problem is:
$ = WH1 (r1) + (1  )WL1 (r1) + 
 
WH2 (r2H) + (1  )WL2 (r2L)

+

H1 (r1)  X1 (r1)  
 
H2 (r2L)  H2 (r2H)

; (25)
with the following rst-order conditions:
d
 
WH1 (r1) + (1  )WL1 (r1)

dr1
+
d
 
H1 (r1)  X1 (r1)

dr1
 0; r1  rmin; @$
@r1
r1 = 0
(26)

dWH2 (r2H)
dr2H
+ 
dH2 (r2H)
dr2H
 0; r2H  rHmin;
@$
@r2H
r2H = 0 (27)
(1  ) dW
L
2 (r2L)
dr2L
  d
H
2 (r2L)
dr2L
 0; r2L  rLmin;
@$
@r2L
r2L = 0 (28)

 
H2 (r2L)  H2 (r2H)
  H1 (r1)  X1 (r1) ;   0; @$@  = 0: (29)
Given that we only have generic functional forms for prot and welfare,
we can just indicate the direction of the distortions as compared to the rst
best.
Proposition 6 If
d(HS (r) XS (r))
dr
< (>)0 for all r 2  rHmin; rHmax ; the optimal
separating equilibrium access price for the rst period is rse1  ()rE. If
d(HS (r) XS (r))
dr
= 0 for all r 2  rHmin; rHmax then rse1 = rE:
Proof. First-order condition (26) is dened on three branches, the rst
ending at rLmax and the second at r
H
max (see Figure 3).
For
d(HS (r) XS (r))
dr
< 0, if  > 0 then the rst-branch local maximum er1 is
lower than rE because expected welfare is strictly concave: This dominates
the local maxima on the second and third branch since at these the LHS
of (26) is negative. Hence, rse1 < r

E: For
d(HS (r) XS (r))
dr
= 0; and by similar
arguments, we nd that rse1 = r

E: Finally, for
d(HS (r) XS (r))
dr
> 0; if  > 0
then the rst-branch local maxima is er1 > rE: Hence, rse1 > rE: If, for any
case,  = 0 then rse1 = r

E:
When the losses from shirking are lower (higher) the higher is the access
price, the regulator should set a rst-period access price lower (higher) than
the socially optimal one under incomplete information. This lower (higher)
access price helps to discourage the high-type entrant from shirking since it
increases its losses from targeting low demand in the rst period. If the e¤ect
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of r on prot is the same whatever the demand captured by the entrant, then
the regulator should not introduce any distortion on the access price since
this would not deter the entrant from shirking.
The most reasonable of these three conditions to be veried is to have
the high demand prot decreasing faster in r than the low demand prot,
since the higher is the access price the lower is the margin the entrant gains
per unit sold, and thus the lower are the gains from capturing high demand.
This is also the condition which holds in the example given in Section 2.
Therefore, for the rest of the paper we will assume that:
d
 
HS (r)  XS (r)

dr
< 0 for all r 2  rHminrHmax ; (30)
and thus, according to Proposition 6, rse1  rE:
Proposition 7 The optimal separating equilibrium access price for the sec-
ond period contingent on high demand is either rse2H  rH or rse2H = rH , while
the one contingent on low demand is rse2L  rL. It is possible that rse2L > rLmax:
Proof. First-order condition (27) is dened on two branches, with the
rst ending at rH (see Figure 2). The local maximum on the rst branch iser2H  rH by (1), and because the welfare function is strictly concave. rH is
the local maximum on the second branch since there (27) does not depend
on r: Therefore, rse2H is either er2H or rH :
First-order condition (28) is dened on three branches since welfare is not
continuous at rLmax and prot is not di¤erentiable at rH .
First assume that rL < rH  rLmax: In this case, the rst branch ends at
rH and its local maximum is er2L  rL by (1) and by the strictly concavity of
the welfare function. Any r2L  rH cannot be optimal since (21) is no longer
active and welfare is lower. If rL < r
L
max < rH , the rst branch ends at r
L
max
and its local maximum is again er2L  rL: The local maximum on the second
branch is its superior limit since @$
@r2L

rrLmax
> 0, but this is dominated by rH
the local maximum on the third branch. If rL  rH ; then (21) is not binding
in equilibrium, and the regulator sets rL, the rst-branch local maximum.
Therefore, rse2L is either er2L  rL or rH > rLmax:
If it is optimal to force investment by the high-type entrant the regulator
should set rH , or simply ban access. However, inducing the high-type entrant
to reveal demand may be too expensive because of the distortions introduced
in the low demand state. Thus, the it may be better not to induce the high-
type entrant to invest but to continue to ask for access. This can be the case,
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for instance, when the probability of a low demand state occurring is very
high, since in this case the distortions introduced in the low demand state
have a high weight in the regulators objective function and, as a consequence,
the regulator should set an access price the closest possible to rL. Hence,
given restriction (21), the regulator may be forced to allow the high-type
entrant to continue to ask for access so that H2 (r2H) is high enough.
Regarding the access price contingent on low demand, to discourage the
high-type entrant from shirking, it should be higher than the rst-best one,
so that the second-period gains from shirking are lower. If rLmax is very low,
the access price the regulator should set may even be such that the low-type
entrant does not ask for access in the second period. This may be optimal
when the probability of a high demand state occurring is high, since in this
case the regulator should denitely force the high-type entrant to invest, and
be less concerned with the distortions introduced in the low demand state.
We have shown in Proposition 6 that no competition in the rst period
is not optimal, since rse1  rE < rLmax: Hence rse2 is o¤ the equilibrium path.
However, the regulator should dene it such that any type of entrant does
not prefer to stay out in the rst period, i.e.
i1 (r
se
1 )  
 
i2 (r
se
2 )  i2 (rse2i )

; 8i = H;L: (31)
When the regulator commits not to look at rst-period demand, there are
no incentives to shirk by the high-type entrant since it cannot inuence the
second-period access price. However, the regulator sets the latter only based
on prior beliefs, just as he does for the rst-period access price. Therefore,
there is a possible trade-o¤.
Proposition 8 Looking at rst-period demand leads to higher welfare than
committing not to look.
Proof. The access prices set by the regulator when he does not look at
rst-period demand give rise to a separating equilibrium since the high-type
entrant does not shirk. Therefore, they are part of the opportunity set of
problem (20) to (24).
We can then conclude that looking at demand in the rst period is always
preferred to not looking despite the eventual distortions introduced in the rst
period and the corresponding rents left to the high-type entrant to obtain
information about demand. This is true since looking at rst period demand
allows the regulator to use this information and set second-period access
prices better suited to the respective demand state.
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As a nal remark, note that the equilibrium access prices that result
from the direct-revelation mechanism are not time-consistent. Indeed, in
this equilibrium, the regulator learns the real state of demand at the end of
the rst period, and thus the ex-post socially optimal access prices for the
second period are di¤erent. Only when the regulator can set the incomplete
information rst-best access prices without inducing to shirk, will second-
period access prices be ex-post optimal.
Social welfare is, however, lower when the regulator cannot commit to his
decisions since the high-type entrant has more incentives to shirk in order
to inuence the regulators ex-post beliefs, and therefore it ends up investing
less often.2 This is nothing more than the ratchet e¤ect known from the
literature.
5 Variations on investment
Until now we have assumed that an investment is viable only for the high-type
entrant, see assumption (10). In this section we change this assumption.
Case 1: Non-viability of investment in both states
This situation corresponds to the following assumption:
I > max

LF ; 
H
F
	
: (32)
In this case, the regulator is not able to induce an entrant to invest in an
own network using the access price. Thus, he can only promote service-based
competition, which implies that the rst-best access price for the second
period is rL or r

H depending on whether demand is low or high, respectively.
With asymmetric information about demand, when the regulator sets the
incomplete information socially optimal access prices, the high-type entrant
shirks if:

 
H2 (r

L)  H2 (rH)

> H1 (r

E)  X1 (rE) : (33)
If this holds, the regulator should introduce distortions similar to the
ones introduced in the previous section. We just need to assume that rH =
+1, and the results come out immediately from Propositions 6 and 7: The
regulator should set rse1  rE and rse2L  rL in order to discourage shirking
by the high-type entrant, while the second-period access price contingent on
high demand should now be rse2H  rH since he cannot force the high-type
entrant to invest.
2Whenever the commitment equilibrium is not time-consistent, one can show that in
the no-commitment equilibrium the high-type entrant shirks at least with some positive
probability.
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Case 2: Viability of investment in both states
Both types of entrants may nd it optimal to invest in their own in-
frastructure in the second period if:
min

LF ; 
H
F
	  I: (34)
Similarly to Proposition 1, there is an access price above which the low-
type entrant prefers to invest, i.e. there is a unique rL 2

rLmin; r
L
max

dened
as the lowest r such that:
LF   I  LS (r) : (35)
Given the regulators preferences for facility-based competition in the long
run, we just consider the case where both investments are socially desirable,
i.e.
wiF   I  wiS (r) for r  ri, 8i = L;H: (36)
In this case, the regulator should ban access in the second period so that
any type of entrant invests. He can then set rE in the rst period, since there
are no incentives to shirk.
6 Consulting the entrant before competition
starts
In this section we introduce a consultation stage where the regulator asks the
entrant about the demand it believes it will capture. This consultation stage
takes place before competition starts, but after the entrant learns demand
through the conduction of a market study. This may bring some gains as
compared to the solution in Section 4 since it already allows the regulator to
set rst-period access prices contingent on the answer given by the entrant,
and therefore the complete information rst best may be possible to achieve.
The regulator can also set second-period access prices contingent on the fact
whether demand level observed later is consistent with what the entrant said
at the beginning. Note that the regulator does not ask about the state of
demand since he would not be able to observe a lie if the high-type entrant
said that demand state is low and shirked in the rst period.
We assume that the regulator announces the price schedule rst, with
automatic selection of the prices given the answer. This is, like this the reg-
ulator can give better incentives as compared to the case where he rst asks
the entrant and then announces the prices ex post. In this latter case, since
the regulator would only dene the lying punishment after it had occurred,
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he would not have incentives to use it, and thus the entrant would more often
lie.
The regulator then sets r1L and r1H which are, respectively, the access
price for the rst period if the entrant says it will capture high or low demand,
r2Lt and r2Ht which are second-period access prices if he observes low or high
demand, respectively, and this is in accordance with the entrants answer,
and r2Lf and r2Hf if it is not. It follows that the consultation stage is not
"cheap talk" since, before the second period, the regulator can check if the
entrant has said the truth about demand.
First note that the regulator prefers the entrant not to lie, since only
then he will obtain any information. Therefore, he will penalize the entrant
for lying. He can do this by banning access in the second period whenever
he observes a lie. In the low demand case this punishment implies that the
entrant will leave the market, but in the high demand case this will only
induce the entrant to invest in an own network.
Thus, in order for the high-type entrant not to lie, the access prices set
by the regulator must be such that the gains from lying are lower than the
losses of being caught, i.e.

 
H2 (r2Ht)  HF + I
  H1 (r1L)  H1 (r1H) : (37)
If r2Ht  rH , r2Hf will not constitute any penalty for lying since the high-
type entrant invests in both cases, the LHS of (37) is zero. In this case, for
r1L < r1H the high-type entrant lies for sure. Therefore, the regulator must
set r1L  r1H :
If r2Ht < rH the regulator e¤ectively penalizes the high-type entrant
when he catches it lying, the LHS of (37) is positive. Therefore he has some
freedom to set rst-period access prices contingent on the answer given by
the entrant with r1L < r1H :
The regulator has also to take into account the high-type entrant incen-
tives for shirking. Hence, similarly to Section 4, he needs to set access prices
such that:
H1 (r1H)  X1 (r1L)  
 
H2 (r2Lt)  H2 (r2Ht)

: (38)
The only di¤erence between this and (21) is that in this case the rst period
access price di¤ers according to the entrants answer.
From these two restrictions we obtain:
H1 (r1H)+
H
2 (r2Ht)  max

H1 (r1L) + 
 
HF   I

;X1 (r1L) + 
H
2 (r2Lt)
	
:
(39)
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If the regulator ignored the incentives to lie and shirk by the high-type
entrant, and set the rst-best access prices, he would only achieve the rst
best if rL  rH ; i.e. if in the rst period the high-type entrant prefers to tell
the truth: Moreover, the high-type entrant would not shirk if and only if
H1 (r

H)  X1 (rL)  
 
H2 (r

L)  HF + I

; (40)
i.e. when rH  rL (RHS of (40) is zero), or when the rst period losses are
higher than the gains from shirking (the LHS of (40) is high enough).
Whenever rL < r

H or (40) do not hold, the regulator has to introduce
distortions similar to the ones introduced in Section 4 to discourage the high-
type entrant from lying and shirking.
Proposition 9 If   
L
1 (rcs1H) L1 (rcs1L)
L2 (rcs2Lt)
; when the regulator can consult the
entrant before competition in the rst-period, optimal access prices are rcs1L 
rL; r
cs
1H  rH , rcs2Lt  rL; and rcs2Ht = rH or rcs2Ht  rH :
Proof. See Appendix B.
The regulator should set a higher r1L and a lower r1H in order to increase
the losses from shirking in the rst period. These also help prevent a lie by
the high-type entrant. Then, he should set a higher r2Lt to decrease the gains
from shirking, while rcs2Ht can be such that the high-type entrant invests or
not.
Note that, we need to assure that the low-type entrant also does not
have incentives to lie. Indeed, if rcs1H < r
cs
1L the low-type entrant may have
incentives to say demand is high despite the punishment it will su¤er in the
second period, i.e. we can have:
L1 (r
cs
1H)  L1 (rcs1L) > L2 (rcs2Lt) : (41)
In this case, this restriction would become active, and we could even have
rcs1L < r

L; r
cs
1H > r

H , and/or r
cs
2Lt < r

L (see discussion in Appendix B).
We will now compare this with the context where there is no consultation
stage, which was the case of previous sections.
Proposition 10 Consulting the entrant before competition leads to (weakly)
higher total welfare than basing access prices on realized demand in the rst
period only.
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Proof. We can prove this by arguments of revealed preferences since
the separating equilibrium obtained in Section 4 is part of the opportunity
set of this game. Just note that the regulator can set r1L = r1H = rse1 ,
r2Lt = r2Lf = r
se
2L and r2Ht = r2Hf = r
se
2H , and obtain the same welfare level.
The existence of a consultation stage may then help to improve welfare.
Only when rcs1L = r
cs
1H ; there will be no gains in asking about demand, and
welfare will be equal to the case where access prices are only based on realized
demand. This happens when rcs2Ht = rH and the restriction r1L  r1H is
biding, i.e. when the regulator wants to force the high-type entrant to invest,
but its gains from lying at rst best are very high, since rL is much lower
than rH . In all other cases, the consultation stage helps the regulator to
dene better access prices right from the beginning of the game, and thus
strictly improves welfare.
Note that this sections results are equal to the ones we would obtain
if instead of asking the entrant about its expected demand, the regulator
asked it to select one of two possible contracts. These two contracts would
be composed by the access price to be paid in the rst period, and the
access price to be paid in the second period if demand captured in the rst
period was low or high, i.e., Rj =
 
rj1; r
j
2L; r
j
2H

; with j = A;B. Contract
A could then be designed to be selected by a low-type entrant, and contract
B by a high-type entrant, inducing the entrant to reveal the demand state
through its contract selection. The restrictions that would assure that each
entrant made the selection correspondent to its type would be the same as
with the consultation stage interpretation. Thus, the contract designed to
be selected by the low-type entrant would be RA =
 
rcs1L; r
cs
2Lt; r
cs
2Hf

, and the
contract designed to be selected by the high-type entrant would be RB = 
rcs1H ; r
cs
2Lf ; r
cs
2Ht

:
7 Conclusion
The existence of asymmetric information about demand when the regulator
sets prices for the entrants access to the incumbents infrastructure creates
incentives for the entrant to target a lower demand. Indeed, given that the
regulator wants to induce an entrant to invest in an own infrastructure, he
can ban access after observing that the entrant has the capability to invest.
Thus an entrant in a high demand state may prefer to target low demand
(shirk) in order to signal to the regulator that it still needs cheap access.
This problem persists even if the regulator commits to access prices ex ante
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since optimal regulation involves setting future access prices contingent on
observed demand.
The regulator solves this problem of incentives by committing to access
prices which are distorted in relation to the rst best. When the decrease in
the entrants prot resulting from a high access price is higher in the high-
demand state, the regulator should set a lower access price for the rst period
in order to increase the initial losses from shirking. Additionally, he should
set a higher second-period access price contingent on low demand so that the
gains from shirking are lower. In the high demand state the entrant may or
may not be induced to invest. Still, social welfare will be higher than if the
regulator were to ignore the entrants demand.
Finally, we also show that a consultation stage before competition starts,
where the regulator asks the entrant about the demand it will capture, may
improve welfare since it allows the regulator to already set rst-period access
prices contingent on demand. Moreover, given that the regulator sets ex-ante
access prices which induce the entrant to tell the truth about the state of
demand, he may even be able to induce to the complete information rst
best.
In future research we intend to relax the assumption that the entrant has
a perfect signal about the state of demand. It will also be interesting to
consider the role of the incumbent in this process. Indeed, if it was possible
for the regulator to ask the incumbent about demand, he could design a
mechanism to obtain additional information. This is interesting because the
incumbent and the entrant may have opposite interests.
Appendix A - Example
Given demand functions (8) and (9), we assume that aE = iaI ; with i =
H;X;L and H > max fL; Xg ; i.e. to a lower demand state corresponds a
lower reservation price. We further assume, for simplicity, that c = 0: Solving
the price competition game as in Vareda (2007), welfare and entrants prot
are:
WS (; r) =
1
2
 
12 + 24   92  2 + 1  2  8  3 
1  2  4  22 a2I
+
3 + 32  4 
4  22 raI   12 5
2 + 4 
4  22 r2
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S (; r) =
  
2  2   aI   2  1  2 r2 
1  2  4  22 ;
and all our assumptions hold:
@S (; r)
@r
=  4
 
2  2   aI   2  1  2 r 
4  22 < 0
@S (; r)
@
=
 
2  2   aI   2  1  2 r 
1  2  4  22 2  2  2 aI > 0
@2S (; r)
@r@
=  4 2  
2 
4  22aI < 0
@WS (; r)
@
=
1
2
  
24   92 + 12+  33   8 aI    1  2  4  32 r 
1  2  4  22 aI > 0
WS (; r) > W
M =
1
2
a2I :
Appendix B - Proof of Proposition 9
We have already argued it cannot be optimal if the entrant lies since in
this case the regulator would be better o¤ not listening to the answer. Thus,
in order to discourage a lie, the regulator sets the highest possible access
prices when he catches the entrant lying, i.e. rcs2Lf = r
cs
2Hf = +1:
To nd the remaining optimal access prices (rcs1L; r
cs
1H ; r
cs
2Lt; r
cs
2Ht) we need
to consider the following Lagrangian:
$ = WH1 (r1H) + (1  )WL1 (r1L) + 
 
WH2 (r2Ht) + (1  )WL2 (r2Lt)

+1

H1 (r1H) + 
H
2 (r2Ht)  X1 (r1L)  H2 (r2Lt)

+2

H1 (r1H) + 
H
2 (r2Ht)  H1 (r1L)  
 
HF   I

:
First-order conditions are:

dWH1 (r1H)
dr1H
+ (1 + 2)
dH1 (r1H)
dr1H
 0; r1H  rHmin;
@$
@r1H
r1H = 0 (42)
(1  ) dW
L
1 (r1L)
dr1L
 1d
X
1 (r1L)
dr1L
 2d
H
1 (r1L)
dr1L
 0; r1L  rLmin;
@$
@r1L
r1L = 0
(43)
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dWH2 (r2Ht)
dr2Ht
+ (1 + 2)
dH2 (r2Ht)
dr2Ht
 0; r2Ht  rHmin;
@$
@r2Ht
r2Ht = 0 (44)
(1  ) dW
L
2 (r2Lt)
dr2Lt
  1d
H
2 (r2Lt)
dr2Lt
 0; r2Lt  rLmin;
@$
@r2Lt
r2Lt = 0 (45)
H1 (r1H) + 
H
2 (r2Ht)  X1 (r1L) + H2 (r2Lt) ; 1  0;
@$
@1
1 = 0 (46)
H1 (r1H) + 
H
2 (r2Ht)  H1 (r1L) + 
 
HF   I

; 2  0; @$
@2
2 = 0: (47)
From (42) and (43), the optimal access prices for the rst period are,
respectively, rcs1H  rH and rcs1L  rL by (1) and using arguments similar to
the ones used in Proposition 7. From (44) we obtain rcs2Ht = rH or r
cs
2Ht  rH
as in Proposition 7; and given (45) we have rcs2Lt  rL:
Note that these are only valid if the low-type entrant does not lie, i.e., if
L1 (r
cs
1L)+ 
L
2 (r
cs
2Lt)  L1 (rcs1H), which we assume to hold. On the contrary,
we would have to include this as a restriction on the regulators problem,
which would add another term in conditions (42), (43) and (45). This term
would have the opposite signal of the terms associated to the other multipli-
ers, and therefore, we could have a solution with rcs1L < r

L; r
cs
1H > r

H , and/or
rcs2Lt < r

L:
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